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RECENT TRENDS IN MISSISSIPPI JUDICIAL RULE MAKING:
COURT POWER, JUDICIAL RECUSALS, AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
Judge Leslie Southwick*
On May 29, 2003, the Mississippi Supreme Court announced seven amend-
ments to various procedural and evidentiary rules.' Though that day was note-
worthy for the significance and number of rule changes, the release of amend-
ments was part of a pattern of continuing revisions by the court to the guides for
practice in the State's courts.
In the twelve months prior to that day, the court had made substantial
changes to the procedures and obligations relating to recusals and disqualifica-
tion of judges.' The court abandoned its long-time refusal to permit cameras in
the courtroom by adopting Rules for Electronic and Photographic Coverage of
Proceedings.' It addressed the increasing use of Mississippi courts by eager out-
of-state counsel by tightening the requirements for pro hac vice appearances.4
Many less sweeping changes were made.
The pace quickened with the release of amendments on May 29, 2003.
These included revising the manner in which cases are to be assigned in both the
circuit and the chancery courts,' requiring preclearance of the text for lawyer
advertisements,' and apparently adopting the federal approach to the introduction
of expert testimony-the Daubert ("Dow-burt") standard.7 Depending on one's
view of the merits of the changes and the procedures for making them, Thursday,
May 29, 2003 might be characterized as a bright day of reform and moderniza-
tion. From the opposite viewpoint, it might be considered Black Thursday.
To use the vernacular, what's going on? The supreme court is undertaking a
comprehensive but largely internal review of the procedures applicable to the
State's courts. The process occasionally is informed by the recommendations of
an Advisory Committee on Rules. Much more frequently, the amendments are
initiated'and drafted by a three-justice committee on rules at the court.
The supreme court's understanding that it has the right to adopt rules of
practice and procedure for the State's courts is generally dated from the 1975
decision of Newell v. State.' It is possible to push the court's interpretation of its
right further back in time to 1968, when the court in Southern Pacific Lumber
* The author is a presiding judge on the Miss COA.
1. 841-846 So. 2d XIX-LXI (West Miss. Cases 2003); available at http://www.mssc.state.
ms.us/decisions/handdowns. At that location select 2003 from the pull-down menu on the left; then select 5-
29-2003. (Mar. 27, 2004).
2. See Miss. R. App. P. 48B, 48C.
3. MISS. CODE OF JuD. CoND. 3B(12).
4. Miss. R. Ap. P. 46(b)(1).
5. See UNit. R. OF CIR. AND COUNTY CT. PRACTICE 1.05, and UNiF. CH. CT. R. 1.06.
6. See MIss. R. OF PROF'L CONDUCT 7.1, 7.2, 7.5, 8, and Miss. DISCIPLINoE R. 8. The rules were suspended
on August 8, 2003, at the request of the state Bar so that additional comments on them could be received. In
Re Rules of Professional Conduct, available at http://www.state.ms. us/decisions/handdowns. At that location
select 2003 from the pull-down menu on the left; then select 5-29-2003. (Mar. 27, 2004).
7. See Miss. R. EVID. 702. The referenced case is Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509
U.S. 579 (1993), which will be discussed later in the analysis of this new evidentiary rule. The pronunciation of
the case name was clarified by Daubert's own counsel, as those learned in French often erroneously pronounce
Jason Daubert's name as "dough-bear." Pronouncing Daubert, 7 GREEN BAG 2d 204 (2004).
8. 308 So. 2d 71 (Miss. 1975).
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Co. v. Reynolds stated that it had "the power to make rules of practice and proce-
dure, not inconsistent with the Constitution, for the efficient disposition of judi-
cial business."9
The existence of judicial authority for rule making is well established in the
nearly thirty years since Newell. Still developing is the reach of that authority
and the proper mechanisms for exercising it. This article seeks to explain the
source of the right that is being exercised, in order better to understand its valid
reach. Recent examples of whether the court's reach has challenged its legiti-
mate grasp will be reviewed. Then one of the most recent and potentially signif-
icant rule changes will be examined-the adoption of a revised rule for the
admission of expert testimony.1" The prior Mississippi law on the use of expert
testimony will be discussed. Then an effort will be made to review the likely
direction that trial issues of the admissibility of such evidence will take.
I. MISSISSIPPI JUDICIAL RULEMAKING POWER
It is accepted in Mississippi that the Supreme court has the authority to pro-
mulgate rules of practice and procedure. Rules of Civil Procedure modeled on
the federal rules were adopted in 1981.11
Despite the lack of present controversy, the supreme court's initial decision
to adopt the Rules of Civil Procedure without legislative involvement was an
assertion of authority that was "among the most extreme ever adopted by an
American court of last resort."12 The small steps that led to this one giant leap
will be examined.
In 1975, the Legislature passed as statutes most of the federal civil rules on
discovery.13 In the same legislation, likely in response to Newell, the Legislature
created an Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Practice and Procedure. 4 That
committee was tasked to make a continuing study of state court practice and pro-
cedure and to draft rules that will "simplify, improve, and expedite the adminis-
tration of justice" in the state." The original legislation required that the com-
mittee submit its proposals to the supreme court. 6 The court could make what-
ever changes it wanted to the proposal, which would then be submitted to the
Legislature. 7 The rules would become effective unless prior to adjournment, a
concurrent resolution of each house disapproved any portion. 8 The Advisory
9. S. Pac. Lumber Co. v. Reynolds, 206 So. 2d 334, 335 (Miss. 1968).
10. Miss. R. Evtn. 702.
11. 395-397 So. 2d I (West Miss. Cases 1981).
12. William H. Page, Constitutionalism and Judicial Rulemaking: Lessons from the Crisis in Mississippi, 3
Miss. C. L. REv. 1, 2 (1983).
13. 1975 Miss. Laws 501, §§ 1-14 (codified as Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-201, -226 to -234,
-236 to -237, -241, -243 (1996)). Section 1 states that all 14 sections "apply to civil proceedings in the circuit,
-hancery and county courts of this state."
14. 1975 Miss. Laws 501, §§ 15-19 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-61 to -69 (1996)).
15. 1975 Miss. Laws 501, § 19 (codified at Miss. CODE AN. § 9-3-69).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 1975 Miss. Laws 501, § 20 (codified at Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-69 and -71 (1996)).
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Committee did its work by preparing an initial draft using the federal rules as its
model. It sent copies to state judges, the state bar, and a wide range of other
interested parties, conducted public hearings, and finalized a proposed set of
Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure in May 1978.9
The court considered the rules, conducted two days of hearings, and then in
January 1979 approved the Advisory Committee's work without modification.
The rules were submitted to the Legislature, but they were rejected.2" The
impasse may have been the kind that could be broken by compromise and the
passage of time. The supreme court was only briefly inclined to find out. It
eventually issued an order on May 26, 1981, finding that under the inherent
authority identified in Newell v. State, the proposed rules would be adopted
effective on January 1, 1982.21 The legislature skirmished for a time with the
court, threatening budget cuts and other penalties. Finally, the legislature relent-
ed."2 Since that time, the Supreme court has enacted without legislative involve-
ment a set of Rules of Evidence, 3 separate rules for circuit and for chancery
court practice, n and a variety of other procedural guidelines.25
The evolution of thought and theory on the right of the Mississippi Supreme
Court to impose rules of trial practice and procedure is striking. No suggestion
can be found until late into the second half of the twentieth century that such
power existed. Prior to that time, it was accepted that the "court has no authority
to prescribe rules for the government of trial courts, and has never attempted to
usurp such power."26
The 1912 Court that denied it had power to create rules for trial courts did
assert the right to draft rules for its own internal practices, a set of revised rules
having just been adopted." The earliest discovered version of rules governing
appellate practice was from 1838. There were twenty-seven sections to the
"Rules of the High Court of Errors and Appeals."" These rules continued to be
changed through the years and in their present iteration are called the
"Mississippi Rules of Appellate Procedure." The supreme court claimed "inher-
ent power" to adopt procedural rules for resolving the appeals presented to it, a
power that "stems from the fundamental constitutional precepts of separation of
powers and the vesting ofjudicial powers in the Courts."29
19. Proposed Miss. R. OF CiV. P. I-II advisory committee's note.
20. Page, supra note 13, at 5-6.
21. 395-397 So. 2d 1.
22. Page, supra note 12, at 6-9; Keith Ball, Comment, The Limits of the Mississippi Supreme Court's Rule-
Making Authority, 60 Miss. L.J. 359, 363-64 (1990).
23. 474-77 So. 2d XXVII (West Miss. Cases 1985).
24. UNiV. R. OF CIR. AND COUNTY CT. PRACTICE (first adopted 1995); UNIF. CH. CT. R. (first adopted 1989).
25. A collection of the supreme court-adopted rules is printed in Mississippi Rules of Court (Thomson-West
2003).
26. Yazoo & M.V.R. Co. v. Kirk, 58 So. 834, 834 (Miss. 1912).
27. Id. (citing "54 So. v" said to be adopted on January 4, 1910). No rules can be found at that page; per-
haps that was a reference to the 1910 version of a preliminary and partial publication of opinions and the rules
were not brought forward in the permanent volume. "Revised Rules of the Supreme Court of Mississippi"
from 1912 are published at 101 Miss. 903.
28. 2 Miss. (1 Howard) vii (1838).
29. Matthews v. State, 288 So. 2d 714, 715 (Miss. 1974) (citing MIss. CONST., art. I, § 1, art. VI, § 144
(1890)).
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There has been substantial analysis already on the supreme court precedent
that led to the present understanding of virtually plenary authority for judicial
rulemaking. 0 It is sufficient for present purposes that in the 1975 Newell v. State
decision, the court relied on separation of powers provisions in the constitu-
tion-namely, that judicial power shall be vested in a judicial branch and that no
member of one branch of government may exercise powers belonging to another
branch of government. 1 Then the court immediately turned to this reasoning:
Without additional words it would seem there is no more reason
to support legislative control of court procedures than there
would be to uphold court supervision of the procedures by
which the legislative and executive departments discharge their
constitutional duties. However, the constitutional directives do
not rest with the pronouncement of these general principles. The
division of authority is specifically implemented by Section 144
of the Constitution:
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in
a Supreme Court and such other courts as are
provided for in this constitution.
This leaves no room for a division of authority between the judi-
ciary and the legislature as to the power to promulgate rules nec-
essary to accomplish the judiciary's constitutional purpose.3 2
One implicit assumption made in this fairly simple analysis is that making
rules for courts is strictly a judicial power. Indeed, the court found it self-evi-
dent. However, for most of the nation and for the federal government, not only
is the principle not self-evident, it is not even correct. A student's review of the
judicial rulemaking power in the various states found that only in "Mississippi,
Connecticut, and New Mexico have the highest courts proclaimed an exclusive
rule-making power in the absence of a constitutional provision" that granted
such power.3 In most other states, the power was shared with the legislature.'
The most common model is that used by the federal government. Proposals are
made by the United States Supreme Court, submitted to the legislative branch,
and become law after the passage of a specific period of time unless revised or
rejected by Congress.35
30. E.g., Ball, supra note 22; Page, supra note 12; Paul B. Herbert, Process, Procedure and
Constitutionalism: A Response to Professor Page, 3 Miss. C. L. REV. 45 (1982); William H. Page, The
Legitimacy of Judicial Rulemaking: A Response to Professor Herbert, 3 Miss. C. L. REV. 59 (1982).
31. Newell, 308 So. 2d at 77 (citing Miss. CONST. art. I, §§ I & 2 (1890)).
32. Id.
33. Ball, supra note 22, at 382.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 373-382; Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.S. §§ 2071-2074 (1988).
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The Mississippi Supreme Court's Newell argument was based on unstated
assumptions and on policy. Simply put, the court is the best source of rules of
practice and procedure for courts. Regardless of the merits of the argument, that
is not the historical or current understanding in most states or in the federal gov-
ernment. Until Newell, that was not the understanding in Mississippi. It also is
not the premise of the current constitution. The Mississippi Constitution estab-
lishes rules for when the Legislature may adopt special or private laws on a vari-
ety of subjects and when it may not. Among these sections is one that requires
that certain matters be provided only by general legislation: "The legislature
shall not pass local, private, or special laws in any of the following enumerated
cases, but such matters shall be provided for only by general laws, viz.: . . .(s)
Regulating the practice in courts of justice[.]"36
The Legislature had used this authority to adopt general laws on a large array
of court practices, including discovery, and rules for circuit and county court
practice. After adoption of the Rules of Civil Procedure, these have largely been
repealed. 7
The statutes that provided for a cooperative effort between the Legislature
and the supreme court have been revised such that rule-making discretion has
been ceded entirely to the judiciary. There is still a statute authorizing an
Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Practice and Procedure; under that statute
the committee reports solely to the Supreme Court. 8 However, the Supreme
Court has not accepted the legislatively authorized committee. Instead, in 1983,
the Court created its own "Advisory Committee on Rules."39 With some modifi-
cations in membership groups, it is that committee that operates today. It
presently contains fifteen members who primarily represent trial-level expertise
within the Bar.4" The Conferences of Chancery Judges and of Circuit Judges
each recommend two representatives, while the County Court Conference rec-
ommends one. A designee of the dean of each Mississippi law school, along with
eight practicing lawyers recommended by different legal associations complete
the voting membership. Law professors serve as the reporters for the committee.
The Supreme Court orders that adopt new rules may reflect that the matter
originated with the Advisory Committee; instead, after a proposal was submitted
from some other source, the Committee may have been referred the rule for eval-
uation." However, more important than the Advisory Committee in the current
36. Miss. CONST. art. 4, § 90 (1890).
37. Detailed chancery court procedures were set out in Mississippi Code sections 11-5-1 through 11-5-123
(repealed 2002). A substantial number of the provisions, such as sections 11-5-7 through 11-5-29 and sections
11-5-53 through 11-5-73, have been repealed since they are addressed in court rules. Similarly, circuit court
procedures were established in Mississippi Code sections 11-7-1 through 11-7-221 (Supp. 2003). Most of sec-
tions 11-7-21 through 11-7-179 have been repealed.
38. 1975 Miss. Laws 501, sections 15-19 (codified as Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-3-69).
39. Supreme court order, Nov. 9, 1983, No. 89-R-99016-SCT (on file with supreme court/court of appeals
clerk). This order provided for 13 members.
40. Supreme court order, July 27, 1995, No. 89-R-99016SCT (on file with supreme court/court of appeals
clerk). This order enlarged the number of members to 15.
41. Examples of rule changes originating with the Advisory Committee are the new historical notes to sev-
eral rules that were approved on May 29, 2003. 841-846 So. 2d XXVI-XXXVI (West Miss. Cases. 2003).
Changes to Rules 701 and 702 were made on the Court's initiative. Id. at XXXVII. A change prompted by nei-
ther the Advisory Committee nor the Supreme Court was made to Mississippi RULES APPELLATE PROCEDURE
40(a) on re?lartligs. "753,754 So. 2d XXX (West Miss. Cases 2000).
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revision process is an internal Supreme Court Rules Committee consisting of
three justices. Chief Justice Pittman directed this Rules Committee to review all
the rules of practice and procedure. Revisions are occurring with some frequen-
cy. Often these do not involve any outside input, as there is neither requirement
nor practice of publishing most proposals for comment from interested
observers. Many of the more important rules, such as the change to the evidence
rule on expert testimony that will be discussed later, are promulgated without
any involvement or even knowledge by the Advisory Committee on Rules.42
The Advisory Committee created by court order was conceived by then-
Chief Justice Neville Patterson in 1983. In his view, "the key to permanency
[was] establishing an Advisory Committee on Rules, a committee appointed by
the Court fairly representative of the bench and bar but wholly independent of
control by anyone other than the Court.... It was the cornerstone of his grand
design" for institutionalizing control and, one would think, the professionalism
and credibility needed in order for the Court to write all procedural rules.43 A
useful evaluation for the Court's internal rules committee is whether what is
called "'peer review" in other pseudo-scientific endeavors mighty not have utility
in a matter of this comprehensiveness and significance. Perhaps the model of
notice and comment rulemaking that leads to new federal rules could with some
benefits be followed in the present enterprise." The federal process has been
summarized this way:
The process by which the federal rules are promulgated,
although subject to periodic criticism, has been praised as "per-
haps the most thoroughly open, deliberative, and exacting
process in the nation for developing substantively neutral rules."
The essence of the federal rulemaking process has remained
constant for the past sixty years. Its basic features include: (1)
the drafting of new rules and rule amendments by prestigious
advisory committees composed of judges, lawyers, and law pro-
fessors; (2) circulation of the committees' drafts to the bench,
bar, and public for comment; (3) fresh consideration [ ] of the
proposed changes by the advisory committees, after taking into
account the comments of the bench, bar, and public; (4) careful
review of the advisory committees' proposals; (5) promulgation
of the proposals by the Supreme Court; and (6) "enactment" of
the proposals into law following the expiration of a statutory
period in which Congress is given an opportunity to reject, mod-
ify, or defer them."
42. Id. Chief Justice Pittman mentioned the revision project to the Joint Legislative Budget Committee in a
meeting that I attended on Sept. 17, 2002. Advisory Committee utilization was explained to the author by a
member of the committee on April 21, 2004.
43. James L. Robertson, "Neville Patterson; A Remembrance," 57 Miss. L.J. 417, 420 (1987).
44. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C.S. sections 2071-2074.
45. Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1655, 1656-57
(1995) (footnotes omitted).
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In fact, the Mississippi Supreme Court has provided for filing an application
with the court for adoption, repeal, or amendment of court rules. The supreme
court/court of appeals clerk will then publish the proposal on the courts' web site
and invite comment. The supreme court at its discretion may submit the propos-
al to the Rules Advisory Committee.46 The court has provided that these proce-
dures may be disregarded if it finds that "the urgency of the proposal or request"
counsels against the delay that arises from the publication and comment period.47
A recent example in which the court reconsidered the need for public com-
ment involved new rules of professional conduct regarding advertising. The
rules were published on May 29, 2003. However, on August 8, 2003, the opera-
tion of the rules was suspended at the request of the State Bar. A new order was
then entered. "After further revisions, the Court now seeks comments from the
bench, the bar, and the public on the proposed draft. This draft has not been
adopted by the Court and should not be read as representing the view of the
Court at this time."48
With respect, having the input of the Advisory Committee on Rules and
inviting public comment prior to promulgation of new rules should become the
universal and not the occasional practice.
II. THE REACH OF RECENT JUDICIAL RULEMAKING
Assumptions about rule-making authority can at times tend toward the sim-
plistic. To say that all judicial power is assigned to the judicial branch begs the
question of whether a certain power is a judicial one. Newell assumed that judi-
cial power must include judicial rule-making authority. The legislative branch,
though, is the quintessential rule-maker. The other branches enforce or interpret.
Both the federal government and most states have recognized that.
These points are not made in order to suggest that the principle of supreme
court absolute rule-making authority in Mississippi is still open to debate. A vic-
tor in that controversy was declared long ago.49 The intention is to indicate that
as future refinements in the understanding of the reach of this power are made,
the larger context should be kept in view. One effect of claiming absolute
power, as the supreme court has done over the making of judicial rules of prac-
tice and procedure, is that it becomes critical to describe the boundaries separat-
46. Miss. R. App. P. 27(f).
47. Id.
48. Supreme court order, Aug. 8, 2003, No. 89-R-99018-SCT, (on file with supreme court/court of appeals
clerk).
49. For a time, some justices on the court had renewed doubts about the rule-making power, especially
when still greater assertions of authority were made.
I was one of the members of this Court named in a Senate Bill to be removed from office for
voting for adoption of [Mississippi Rules of Civil Procedure] in 1981. Had I had any inkling
then that this Court would some day assert the power the majority does now, I would have saved
them the trouble of a hearing. I would have walked over and pleaded guilty.
Hall v. State, 539 So. 2d 1338, 1349, 1365 (Miss. 1989) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting). The Hall majority rejected
several statutes that sought to declare what was competent hearsay evidence in child sex abuse cases.
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ing that absolute judicial power from the legislative power to make policy-level
decisions for all of government through legislation.
An example of situations in which boundaries become important can be seen
in a student comment that examined one issue-namely, whether the length of
time within which to appeal should be considered a legislative matter or one for
the judicial branch."0 The conclusion of the student author was that the rulemak-
ing power existed if the matter being governed solely affected a case after it had
been filed within the court system, and did not exist if rights of individuals
before or after a case had been brought were affected."
The student comment was instigated by a supreme court opinion that found
that a statute requiring an appeal from county court within ten days of judgment
was trumped by a court rule that permitted appeal if notice was filed within thir-
ty days:
We note that when the Uniform Rules of Circuit and County
Court Practice were adopted, the thirty-day period was used in
the interest of promoting uniformity between our rules and the
federal appellate rules which allow thirty days. With the adop-
tion of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the Court's pronounce-
ments in Hall v. State, 539 So.2d 1338, 1345 (Miss.1989), and
Newell v. State, 308 So.2d 71, 76 (Miss.1975), we articulated its
power to establish rules regarding appeals from court to court,
and its mandate that such rules supercede statutes which are in
conflict with the rules. Accord, Van Meter v. Alford, 774 So.2d
430, 432 (Miss.2000); American Investors, Inc. v. King, 733
So.2d 830, 832 (Miss.1999).1
2
What this decision in Davis v. Nationwide Recovery Service raised was an
issue of boundaries. What are the purely procedural matters that are within the
court's authority and what are the kinds of rules that are not? The court had ear-
lier concluded that for a right of appeal to exist, a statute must create 
it.5 3
Statutes that establish a "time within which appeals shall be taken are both
mandatory and jurisdictional, and must be strictly complied with. The court is
without power to [engraft] any exception on the statute."'  The Legislature has
not maintained even these boundaries. In 1991, the statute requiring that appeals
be taken from circuit or chancery court within thirty days of judgment was
50. Justin L. Matheny, Comment, Inherent Judicial Rule Making Authority and the Right to Appeal: Time
for Clarification, 22 Miss. C. L. Rev. 57 (2002).
51. Id. at 67-69 .
52. Davis v. Nationwide Recovery Serv., Inc., 797 So. 2d 929 (Miss. 2001) (referring to Miss. CODE ANN. §
11-51-79 (1972) (10 days) and UNIF. R. OF CIR. AND COUNTY CT. PRACTICE 5.04 (30 days)).
53. Gill v. Miss. Dep't of Wildlife Conservation, 574 So. 2d 586, 590 (Miss. 1990); Fleming v. State, 553
So. 2d 505, 506 (Miss. 1989) ("An appeal is a matter of statutory right and not based on any inherent common
law or constitutional right.") (citing Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)).
54. Moore v. Sanders, 569 so. 2d 1148, 1150 (Miss. 1990) (citing Dependents of Townsend v. Dyer
Woodturnings, 459 So. 2d 300, 302 (Miss. 1984)).
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repealed.55 As the court itself held, a statute is needed to set the deadline for
appeals. 6  Fortunately for constitutional validity, the legislature has not
repealed the general statute that creates the right to appeal from circuit or
chancery court in a civil case. 57
What is at times in play is a view by the supreme court that it will seek to
accommodate the Legislature by considering statutory procedural rules in a
"cooperative spirit" in an effort to provide for the "fair and efficient administra-
tion of justice." 8 The Legislature itself has defined its understanding of the
boundaries between legislative and judicial power this way:
As a part of the judicial power granted in Article 6, Section 144,
of the Mississippi Constitution of 1890, the Supreme Court has
the power to prescribe from time to time by general rules the
forms of process, writs, pleadings, motions, rules of evidence,
and the practice and procedure for trials and appeals in the Court
of Appeals and in the circuit, chancery, and county courts of this
state and for appeals to the Supreme Court from interlocutory or
final orders of trial courts and administrative boards and agen-
cies, and certiorari from the Court of Appeals.5
Both the court in Newell and the Legislature in the just-cited statute indicate
that the courts have authority over practice and procedure. What is practice or
procedure is undefined. Procedure versus substance is one potential dividing
line. That often proves an elusive demarcation, though, since procedure can
affect substance. Perhaps if the matter is some form of conduct occurring within
a court-from the time suit was properly commenced in that court until it is dis-
posed of by the same court-that is likely an issue of practice and procedure.
Statutes of limitations are not mere internal practice and procedure, as they
affect the issue of how soon a dispute that initially lies outside of the court sys-
tem must be brought through the courthouse doors. When the supreme court has
in the past determined that a statute must create the right of appeal and set the
time limits, that may reflect that the policy component for this inter-court proce-
dure is not the province of any one court, not even the supreme one."0
Lawrence Franck, a prominent, public-spirited Jackson attorney whose
scholarly 1972 law journal article directly impacted the 1975 Newell opinion,
made this attempt to describe the judiciary's prerogatives in rulemaking:
The division [between matters properly within the control of the
legislature and those for the courts] is dependent upon whether
the matters involve primarily questions of important public poli-
55. MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-51-5 (1972) repealed 1991 Miss. Laws 573, § 141.
56. Moore, 569 So. 2dat 1150.
57. MISS CODE ANN. § 11-51-3 (Supp. 2002).
58. Newell, 308 So. 2d at 78.
59. MISS. CODE ANN. § 9-3-61 (Supp. 2002).
60. Gill, 574 So. 2d at 590; Fleming, 553 So. 2d at 506.
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cy, in which case they are properly of legislative concern, or
whether they relate primarily to the effective and orderly admin-
istration of justice-the dispatch of the business of the courts-
in which case they are properly the subject of the judicial rule-
making power. Questions relating to the creation of courts, their
organization, the salaries of their officials, and the subjects over
which they can exercise jurisdiction are all matters involving
important policy considerations and should be under the control
of the legislative branch. Similarly, the length of the period of
limitations in various cases primarily involves policy considera-
tions, rather than the orderly dispatch of the judicial business,
and is therefore subject to legislative action.
61
Though the supreme court in Newell found that separation of powers without
question gave the judiciary the power to make its own rules, it should not be for-
gotten that neither in the federal nor in the Mississippi Constitution are three
entirely separate, watertight compartments formed.62 Checks and balances inject
each branch into the affairs of the others. The Mississippi Supreme Court wrest-
ed from the legislature the power to adopt rules of practice and procedure; the
court has not arrogated all power over matters that touch or concern the judicial
system. As the Franck article argued, policy decisions are largely legislative
ones, even if the policies affect another branch of government.
Whether a person has timely presented a claim in court is con-
trolled by legislatively-drafted rules called statutes of limitation.
Whether and for how long a party has the right to move beyond
the initial court and appeal to another court has also as recently
as the 1990 Moore v. Sanders decision been recognized as a leg-
islative matter. I do not believe that the judiciary has the right
to decide even after the most careful deliberation that the proper
time after judgment for all appeals is a day, or a year. Such
indisputably policy decisions, unrelated to the internal operation
of either the trial or the appellate court, are for the legislature.63
Perhaps an even more significant policy-level decision has been much in
view in the year 2003 at the supreme court. It is probably fair to say that Justice
Chuck McRae became one of the most controversial justices ever to serve on the
supreme court. An intelligent and assertive judge, he has displayed an interest in
6 1. Lawrence J. Franck, Practice and Procedure in Mississippi.- An Ancient Recipe for Modern Reform, 43
Miss. L.J. 287, 303-304 (1972). On the other hand, "the form, content and manner of service of process should
be matters of judicial, not legislative concern, since they go solely to the orderly administration of the judicial
business." Id. at 304. Franck's article was cited with approval in Newell, 308 So. 2d at 78.
62. Leslie H. Southwick, Separation of Powers at the State Level: Interpretations and Challenges in
Mississippi, 72 Miss. L.J. 927, 971-75 (2003).
63. Wolfe v. City of D'Iberville, 799 So. 2d 142, 151 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (Southwick, P.J., concurring).
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crafting precedents that were favorable to the interests of plaintiffs in personal
injury actions.' Other appellate judges, including the author of this article, may
from time to time also appear to various observers to have brought their back-
ground experiences into play in their rulings on the bench."5 In the never-ending
and ever-escalating tort wars being fought out at every level of the Mississippi
court system, there are frequent motions for recusal brought against judges.
Justice McRae's perceived inclinations have led to frequent motions for recusal
brought against him. With some frequency, he has agreed to recuse himself.
The supreme court majority has had a much different view of the effect of his
recusal than does the justice himself.
A series of orders have resulted in which the majority on the court chal-
lenges the view that the recusal of a justice should result in a gubernatorial
appointment of a replacement for that particular case. The constitutional and
statutory materials are these:
Mississippi Constitution Article 6, Section 165:
No judge of any court shall preside on the trial of any cause,
where the parties or either of them, shall be connected with him
by affinity or consanguinity, or where he may be interested in
the same, except by the consent of the judge and of the parties.
Whenever any judge of the Supreme Court or the judge or chan-
cellor of any district in this state shall, for any reason, be unable
or disqualified to preside at any term of court, or in any case
where the attorneys engaged therein shall not agree upon a
member of the bar to preside in his place, the governor may
commission another, or others, of law knowledge, to preside at
such term or during such disability or disqualification in the
place of the judge or judges so disqualified.66
64. A possible example of a desired result controlling over the legal reasoning is Hurst v. Southwest
Mississippi Legal Services Corp., 610 So. 2d 374 (Miss. 1992) (Hurst 1), which reversed a summary judgment
on a variety of grounds that have subsequently been repudiated. E.g. Rains v. Gardner, 731 So. 2d 1192 (Miss.
1999) (rejected section of Hurst I that seemingly ignored the right under Miss. R. Civ. PRoc. 4(h) to make spe-
cial appearance to contest jurisdiction); Hurst v. S.W. Miss. Legal Servs. Corp., 691 So. 2d 1038 (Miss. Ct.
App. 1996) (mem.) (found on second appeal that Hurst I applied an understanding of collateral estoppel and res
judicata that would be a sub silentio overruling of decades of jurisprudence; "such an unannounced revolution
in the law should be presumed only with great care"; and alluded to the justice's statement to the trial judge
after remand, which the judge then repeated for the record, that the specifics of the 1992 Hurst I opinion were
not that important, but the court was just finding that summary judgment was error), afid, 708 So. 2d 1347
(Miss. 1998).
Justice McRae left the Court in January 2004.
65. This article's author, for example, was criticized in a political campaign for bias in having denied that a
woman had a right to damages from the sheriff after she had been assaulted by a county jail "trusty" who had
been let out on a weekend pass. Banks v. E. L. G., 691 So. 2d 1048 (Miss. Ct. App. 1996) (mem.) (Southwick,
J., dissenting), cert. denied, 691 So. 2d 1031 (Miss. 1997) (case was settled while it was pending on writ of cer-
tiorari).
66. MIss. CONST. art. 6, §165 (1890).
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Mississippi Code Section 9-1-105:
(1) Whenever any judicial officer is unwilling or unable to hear
a case or unable to hold or attend any of the courts at the time
and place required by law by reason of the physical disability or
sickness of such judicial officer, by reason of the absence of
such judicial officer from the state, by reason of the disqualifica-
tion of such judicial officer pursuant to the provision of Section
165, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, or any provision of the
Code of Judicial Conduct, or for any other reason, the Chief
Justice of the Mississippi Supreme Court, with the advice and
consent of a majority of the justices of the Mississippi Supreme
Court, may appoint a person as a special judge to hear the case
or attend and hold a court.
(4) If the Chief Justice pursuant to this section shall make an
appointment within the authority vested in the Governor by rea-
son of Section 165, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, the
Governor may at his election appoint a person to so serve. In the
event that the Governor makes such an appointment, any
appointment made by the Chief Justice pursuant to this section
shall be void and of no further force or effect from the date of
the Governor's appointment.
(5) When a judicial officer is unwilling or unable to hear a case
or unable or unwilling to hold court for a period of time not to
exceed two (2) weeks, the trial judge or judges of the affected
district or county and other trial judges may agree among them-
selves regarding the appointment of a person for such case or
such limited period of time. The trial judges shall submit a
notice to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court informing him
of their appointment. If the Chief Justice does not appoint anoth-
er person to serve as special judge within seven (7) days after
receipt of such notice, the person designated in such order shall
be deemed appointed.6"
These twin provisions could be seen as complementary.68 The governor has
the right to name a replacement judge under Section 165 of the constitution. If
the governor fails to do so, then the supreme court may name a replacement who
will always be subject to being displaced if the governor subsequently exercises
67. Miss. CODE ANN. § 9-1-105 (1993).
68. That the statute does not impinge on the constitutional prerogatives of the governor was the position
taken in McDonald v. McDonald, 850 So. 2d 1182, 1186-87 (Miss. Ct. App. 2002), cert. granted, 840 So. 2d
716 (Miss. 2003).
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his prerogatives. The constitution explicitly provides for a gubernatorial selec-
tion when a supreme court justice "shall, for any reason, be unable or disquali-
fied to preside ... in any case where the attorneys engaged therein shall not
agree upon a member of the bar to preside in his place," and not just for longer-
term reasons.69
The position taken by a five-justice majority on the supreme court is that the
recusal of a justice for one case should not result in either a gubernatorial or a
court-named replacement. The court said that the litigant who wanted a replace-
ment to be named by the governor was incorrect "in her belief that at any time
fewer than nine justices participate in a case the Governor must ... appoint spe-
cial justices to fill out a 'full complement of justices.""'7 What the court found
controlling were these considerations:
1. There would be a quorum so long as five justices were available;71
2. "It is quite common of justices of this Court to elect for various rea-
sons not to participate in cases," rising perhaps to 500 occasions per
year; to "require appointments in every such situation would addi-
tionally impose burden and expense" on all concerned that was not
intended by the constitutional provision.7
3. Requiring an appointment "could in closely controverted cases, where
a single vote will be decisive, place the ultimate power to adjudicate
with the executive branch rather than with the judiciary.""
These prudential considerations are reasons that appointment of a replace-
ment justice in every case is not desirable or necessary. Prudence would not
affect power, however. If someone sent by the governor under this section 165
authority because of a justice's recusal from one case were to knock on the door
to the court's en banc room, there would be little basis on which to deny that per-
son entrance when that case was being discussed. It should be acknowledged,
though, that the supreme court has stated that unless there is both an absence of a
quorum and the parties cannot agree on special justices, "such an appointment
[by the governor] is not authorized by our Constitution."' 4 It is unexceptional to
state that a special appointment is undesirable absent the quorum issue. The
court, though, has declared such an appointment would be unconstitutional.
That latter position perhaps should be reconsidered.
It should also be recognized in these difficult budgetary times for state gov-
ernment, that a pragmatic issue in appointment of a special justice is the shortage
of funds to pay the person's salary. For example, Justice Oliver Diaz has been
on paid leave from the court since July 2003, leave that may extend more than a
69. Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 165.
70. Hewes v. Langston, No. 1999-IA-00646-SCT (Miss. 2003). The text of the order was reproduced in all
but verbatim form in the opinion issued on the merits of the case. Hewes v. Langston, 853 So. 2d 1237, 1241
(Miss. 2003).
71. Hewes, slip op. at 2. MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 145B (1890) provides that five justices are a quorum. See
also Hewes, 853 So. 2d at 1241.
72. Hewes, slip op. at 4. See also Hewes, 853 So. 2d at 1242-43.
73. Hewes, slip op. at 5. See also Hewes, 853 So. 2d at 1243.
74. Hewes, 853 So. 2d at 1243.
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year.7  A supreme court associate justice's salary is $112,530.76 A replacement
judge, with certain exceptions, is entitled to 1/260th of the salary for the position
for each day of service." It might be difficult to find that much discretionary
money for a full-time replacement justice during a long, paid absence. Again,
this is a prudential consideration and does not reflect a lack of constitutional
power in the governor.
The risk of not having a quorum has in the past motivated an appointment.
There has been at least one occasion in which an appointee to a permanent
vacancy did not wish to serve any longer than needed to avoid a quorum issue
from arising. When the court had only three justices, Jackson attorney Colin
Tarpley was appointed to a vacancy in November 1851 and resigned as soon as
that term of court ended a few weeks later. An election soon followed to name
the regular replacement. At the next legislative session, the governor reported to
the Legislature that he had appointed Tarpley because he had feared "that there
might be a failure in the December Term of the Court" to have a quorum if one
of the other two justices failed to attend. Once the term ended, Tarpley resigned
and a newly elected justice took office before the next term of court.
78
In the recent temporary replacement dispute, the court was attempting to
establish a rule of procedure restraining the governor-namely, that no special
justice may be named unless the court cannot otherwise form a quorum. There is
considerable merit to the point as a matter of practicality, but that is not what the
constitutional provision nor the statute provides. "Whenever any judge of the
Supreme Court ... be unable or disqualified to preside at any term of court, or in
any case," the governor may make an appointment. These orders in various
cases are announcements of the court's effort to guide the utilization of a consti-
tutional provision that permits the governor to act much more frequently than the
court wants him to do. Perhaps in a mirror to the supreme court's stated desire to
consider procedural rules adopted by the Legislature in a "cooperative spirit" in
an effort to provide for the "fair and efficient administration of justice,"8 gover-
nors may be reluctant to appoint whenever a litigant or a recused justice invites
him to do so unless the court has also indicated a willingness to accept a tempo-
rary justice into its counsels. Yet the court should quite cautiously announce
perceived limits on that power.
In the past, when a justice was likely to be off the bench for a considerable
period of time, the governor's appointment of a temporary replacement might
even be invited by the court. In 1982, Mississippi Supreme Court Justice
Lemuel Smith, Jr., underwent surgery and was unable to participate in court
business during his period of recuperation."1 Chief Justice Neville Patterson
75. Jerr Mitchell, "Charges may alter opinion of Miss. judiciary," CLARION LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), July
27, 2003 at IA.
76. MIss. CODE ANN. § 25-3-35 (1) (Rev. 2003) (eff. Jan. 1, 2004).
77. MIss. CODE ANN. § 9-1-105 (10) (Rev. 2002). That section provides that a current judge appointed to
serve temporarily in some other judgeship receives no additional compensation.
78. Miss. H. J. 19 (1852) (governor's message of Jan. 6, 1852).
79. MIss. CONST. art. 6, § 165 (1890) (emphasis added).
80. Newell, 308 So. 2d at 78.
81. Kevin Haney, Ill Justice Is Replaced till Recovery, CLARION-LEDGER, Apr. 9, 1982, at A3.
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encouraged Governor William Winter to name prominent former Bar president
and New Albany attorney T. Leslie Darden to serve until Smith was able to
return to the court.82 The governor made the appointment, and Darden served
from March 29 until May 14, 1982."3 Justice Darden participated in fifty-nine
cases with published opinions and wrote seven of those opinions.84 Justice
Smith returned to the court and again participated in case decisions, but quite
soon resigned effective on June 30, 1982.85 The governor, after receiving rec-
ommendations from a judicial selection advisory committee, appointed
Chancellor Lenore Prather to take office on July 15, 1982.86
The supreme court is concerned that gubernatorial appointments in closely
divided cases might cause the executive to be able to affect the outcome of
cases. That is technically true. Of some importance, though, it is constitutional-
ly permitted. What these considerations highlight is that as in so much affecting
the Mississippi judiciary, the struggle between plaintiffs' lawyers and defense
interests infect the application of rules that were written in, if not simpler times,
at least less perpetually contentious ones.
A renewed use of this power of appointment at least when a justice will be
unable to serve for an extended time period would be beneficial.
This was a review of examples of the Mississippi Supreme Court's recent
interpretations of the reach of its rulemaking prerogatives. What concludes this
article is a focus on an evidentiary rule revised by the court in 2003.
III. RECENT REVISION TO EVIDENTIARY RULE REGARDING EXPERT TESTIMONY
The exercise of plenary rule-making authority has led to a variety of signifi-
cant changes to the rules controlling the practice and procedure in State courts.
A matter of debate in the courts for several years had been whether the federal
courts' direction on the introduction of expert witness testimony should be fol-
lowed in Mississippi's state courts. Part of the debate has ended with the adop-
tion of a new rule. The debate on the meaning of the change now begins.
On May 29, 2003, the Mississippi Supreme Court adopted a revised rule of
evidence on the use of expert testimony. Until that time, the Mississippi courts
had refused to join in the recent trend of rejecting the traditional test for the
admission of expert testimony in favor of the approach used in federal courts. It
is important to analyze whether the new rule fully embraces this modern trend
and fully abandons the State's former devotion to the traditional test. We should
also seek clarity to just what the new rule requires, regardless of whether it is the
standard of the federal rule or something different. Whatever the rule will prove
82. Electronic mail response from former Governor William Winter to author (Oct. 20, 2003) (on file with
author); discussion of unknown date between author and Court of Appeals Administrator Judy Lacy, who was
a judicial assistant at the supreme court in 1982.
83. 404-409 So. 2d v (West Miss. Cases 1982); 410-416 So. 2d v (West Miss. Cases 1982).
84. WESTLAW search of supreme court opinions handed down in the first half of 1982 revealed these fig-
ures.
85. 410-416 So. 2d V (West Miss. Cases 1982). Justice Smith's participation in opinions between May 14
and June 30, 1982 was revealed in a WESTLAW search.
86. Joy McIlwain & Brian Williams, 1st Woman Named to Supreme Court, CLARION-LEDGER, July 2, 1982,
at Al.
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over time to mean in specifics, the state supreme court has found "that the
Daubert test has effectively tightened, not loosened, the allowance of expert tes-
timony."87 The place to start is with the revised rule itself.
Rule 702. Testimony by Experts
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of
reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the case.
[Amended effective May 29, 2003 to clarify the gatekeeping
responsibilities of the court in evaluating the admissibility of
expert testimony.]88
Prior to the 2003 amendment, the rule contained the exact language of the
first part of the revised rule. The change was to add the word "if' and the three
enumerated conditions for determining whether the testimony should be admit-
ted. This makes the rule language identical to Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
The comment to the Mississippi rule was also changed. The first paragraph
of the comment is unchanged from its prior language. It discusses that hypothet-
ical questions to experts are not required, but instead the rule "encourage[s] the
use of expert testimony in non-opinion form when counsel believes the trier can
draw the requisite inference .... [I]t will still be possible for an expert to take
the next step of suggesting the inference which should be drawn from applying
the specialized knowledge to the facts."8
It is the next part of the comment in which the thrust of the rule's new lan-
guage is explained. The first sentence and citations remain the same. All the
remainder of the following paragraph was added in 2003:
As has long been the practice in Mississippi, Rule 702 rec-
ognizes that one may qualify as an expert in many fields in addi-
tion to science or medicine, such as real estate, cotton brokering,
auto mechanics or plumbing. Boggs v. Eaton, 379 So. 2d 520
(1980); Early-Gary, Inc. v. Walters, 294 So. 2d 181 (Miss.
1974); Ludlow Corp. v. Arkwright-Boston Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co.,
317 So. 2d 47 (Miss. 1975). [All of the remainder was added in
2003.] Rule 702 is the standard for the admission of expert tes-
timony from such other fields as well as for scientific testimony.
See Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
87. Miss. Transp. comm'n v. McLemore, 863 So. 2d 31, 38 (Miss. 2003).
88. Miss. R. EVID. 702.
89. Miss. R. EviD. 702 cmt.
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By the 2003 amendment of Rule 702, the Supreme Court
clearly recognizes the gate keeping responsibility of the trial
court to determine whether the expert testimony is relevant and
reliable. This follows the 2000 adoption of a like amendment to
Fed. R. Evid., 702 adopted in response to Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). It is important
to note that Rule 702 does not relax the traditional standards for
determining that the witness is indeed qualified to speak an
opinion on a matter within a purported field of knowledge, and
that the factors mentioned in Daubert do not constitute an exclu-
sive list of those to be considered in making the determination;
Daubert's "list of factors was meant to be helpful, not defini-
tive." Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 151. See also Pepitone v. Biomatrix,
Inc. 288 F. 3d 239 (5th Cir. 2002). [Comment amended May 29,
2003 .]90
Removed from the comment to the former language of the rule were two
paragraphs regarding what has traditionally been known as the Frye test for the
validity of expert testimony. 1 Surely the new language of the rule and comment
is meant to take Mississippi law on a different course. A brief discussion of
where the law was will help explain what the changes likely mean.
A. Background - The Frye Test
The 1923 Frye case concerned the admissibility of polygraph examination
evidence. The defendant Frye, charged with murder, wanted to introduce evi-
dence of a "deception test," i.e., a polygraph examination. 2 The United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit stated that scientific opin-
ion should not be allowed as evidence in a trial until the principles on which that
testimony was based were "sufficiently established to have gained 'general
acceptance' in the particular field in which it belongs."93 As with many court-
created tests, what might have appeared quite cogent in initial contemplation
proved difficult to apply. Part of the problem was recognized in Frye itself:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line
between the experimental and the demonstrable stages is diffi-
cult to define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential
force of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will
go a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing from
which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it
belongs.94
90. Id.
91. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
92. Id. at 1013-14.
93. Id. at 1014.
94. Id.
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
The Mississippi Supreme Court first referred to the Frye test in 1961 when it
too decided not to accept polygraph test results as evidence." It did not refer to
Frye again in a published opinion until 1992.9 However, when the Mississippi
Rules of Evidence were adopted in September 1985, the comment to Rule 702
specifically incorporated the Frye test. It cited Frye after stating that the new
rule did not "relax the requirement that the scientific principle from which the
expert's opinion is derived 'must be sufficiently established to have gained gen-
eral acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs."' 97 The supreme court
in the 1985 comment quoted a similar test from then-recent Mississippi prece-
dent that did not cite Frye: "Is the field of expertise one in which it has been
scientifically established that due investigation and study in conformity with
techniques and practices generally accepted within the field will produce a valid
opinion? Where the answer to this question is in the affirmative, we generally
allow expert testimony.9 8
The court in several cases throughout the 1990's was asked to abandon the
Frye test. It refused: "Mississippi has not adopted the Daubert test for determin-
ing admissibility of scientific evidence. Instead, this Court has adhered to appli-
cation of the Frye test."' 9
With the revisions to Rule 702 and the adoption of a comment referring to
key United States Supreme Court precedents, surely the court meant to make
changes to the manner in which the admission of expert testimony is evaluated
at trial. What follows is an examination of each part of the new rule and an
analysis of the likely effect of its language.
B. Guiding Principles: Reliability and Relevance Are the
Trial Judge's Touchstones
Before studying the trees, a step back to consider the forest is desirable. The
amended rule of evidence creates a much larger and more searching role for the
trial judge. What is being analyzed through all the various perspectives on the
issues that will be discussed below is that the evidence has relevance and relia-
bility. On the other hand, it is not the trial judge's function to decide whether
the expert opinion is correct. The judge's obligation to engage in that final
analysis might at times be implied in some of the methodology that will be
reviewed, but it is a false implication.
95. Mattox v. State, 128 So. 2d 368, 372 (Miss. 1961).
96. Polk v. State, 612 So. 2d 381, 390 (Miss. 1992).
97. 474-477 So. 2d XXV, XLII (West Miss. Cases 1985).
98. Id., (quoting House v. State, 445 So. 2d 815, 822 (Miss. 1984)). The comment then stated "See also
Hardy v. Brantley, 471 So. 2d 358, 366 (Miss. 1985)." Another contemporary case to the same effect, but
issued after the Rules of Evidence were adopted, was Mississippi Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. V.
Garrett, 487 So. 2d 1320, 1326 (Miss. 1986).
99. Gleeton v. State, 716 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Miss. 1998); see also Humphrey v. State, 759 So. 2d 368, 384
(Miss. 2000); Crawford v. State, 716 So. 2d 1028, 1045 (Miss. 1998); Polk 612 So. 2d at 390.
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An example of this distinction was made in the Fifth Circuit case of Pipitone
v. Biomatrix, Inc.,100 which is cited in the new comment to Rule 702 as an exem-
plar of the proper application of the Daubert approach:
Based on the summary judgment record in this case, we believe
that the answer to the critical causation question will depend on
which set of predicate facts the fact-finder believes: the plain-
tiffs' contention that the content of the Synvisc syringe adminis-
tered to Pipitone was contaminated or the defendant's that it was
not. The Advisory Committee notes to Rule 702 speak to the
precise problem in today's case:
When facts are in dispute, experts sometimes
reach different conclusions based on competing
versions of the facts. The emphasis in the
amendment on "sufficient facts or data" is not
intended to authorize a trial court to exclude an
expert's testimony on the ground that the court
believes one version of the facts and not the
other. 101
The trial judge is the guardian at the gate. The fact-finder determines what
is truth to the extent mere mortals find an answer to so fundamental a question.
The gatekeeper determines what may properly be allowed to be presented to the
fact-finder and what must be blocked as insubstantial, irrelevant, or incredible.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit made an apt distinction
that the party offering the expert testimony "need not prove to the judge that the
expert's testimony is correct, but she must prove by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the testimony is reliable."" 2 Thus, experts with quite divergent testi-
mony may all satisfy the standards that will be discussed for reliability and rele-
vance. Such evidence is then sorted through by the fact-finder.
This is a distinction easy to state, easy to understand, but at times not so easy
to maintain. Both trial courts and appellate courts need to maintain the boundary
between the two.
C. Subject Matter: Scientific, Technical, or Other Specialized Knowledge
Rule 702 applies to "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." ' 3
That has been the coverage of the rule since its adoption in 1985. A frequent
issue in prior Mississippi case law has been whether the opinion being expressed
qualifies as one based on specialized knowledge or whether it is strictly a lay
opinion admissible under Rule 701.
100. 288 F.3d 239 (5th Cir. 2002) (cited in Miss. R. EVID. 702 cmt.).
101. Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., 288 F.3d 239, 249 (quoting FED. R. EvlD. 702 advisory committee's note).
102. Moore v. Ashland Chem., Inc., 151 F.3d 269, 276 (5th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
103. Miss. R. Ev1D. 702.
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A lay witness in some circumstances may give an opinion:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness's testi-
mony in the form of opinions or inferences is limited to those
opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the per-
ception of the witness [and] (b) helpful to the clear understand-
ing of his testimony or the determination of a fact in issue.1"4
Making a distinction between lay and expert opinion conceptually would not
appear especially difficult, but it has proved to be in some of the precedent. The
supreme court has identified "a bright line rule" that "where, in order to express
the opinion, the witness must possess some experience or expertise beyond that
of the average, randomly selected adult, it is a M.R.E. 702 opinion and not a 701
opinion.""1 5 The court summarized this way:
Stated differently, if a trial court must delve into a witness'
background to determine if he possesses the necessary educa-
tion, experience, knowledge or training in a specific field in
order for the witness to testify as to his opinions concerning that
particular field, then M.R.E. 702 applies.
1 0 6
Lay opinions are those which require no specialized knowledge, however
attained; 11 7 "if particular knowledge... is necessary to assist the trier of fact...
then such testimony would never qualify as a lay witness opinion under M.R.E.
701." ''  The comment to the rule has since its adoption in 1985 stated that
expert testimony may come from experience "in many fields in addition to sci-
ence or medicine, such as real estate, cotton brokering, auto mechanics or
plumbing.""1 Therefore, an opinion may require examination under Rule 702
even though it is not offered through a person, as the old saying provides, who is
an expert because he is from out of town and is carrying a briefcase.110 Several
academic degrees are not needed in order to qualify someone as an expert wit-
ness. Relevant specialized knowledge is the prerequisite, however attained.
An example of lay testimony would be opinions from two private citizens
who stopped at an automobile wreck, who believed that one of the drivers was
acting in a way that suggested that he was intoxicated. "Both opinions that
Havard had too much to drink were based on the witnesses' perceptions and
observations, which were fully described in their testimony. This testimony was
helpful to the jurors and within the proper scope of lay testimony."1' Testimony
104. Miss. R. EviD. 701.
105. Langston v. Kidder, 670 So. 2d 1, 3-4 (Miss. 1995)
106. Id. at 4, (citing Hardy, 471 So. 2d at 366).
107. Id. (citing Miss. State Highway Comm'n v. Gilich, 609 So. 2d 367, 377 (Miss. 1992)).
108. Id. (citing Wells v. State, 604 So. 2d 271, 279 (Miss. 1992)).
109. Miss. R. EVID. 702 cmt.
110. For a comment that needs no citation, a citation is offered. Hall v. Hilbun, 466 So. 2d 856, 875 (Miss.
1985).
111. Havard v. State, 800 So. 2d 1193, 1196 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001).
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from a police officer concerning how the wreck that he did not witness had likely
occurred, drawing on his experience investigating accidents, would be "by defin-
ition not a lay opinion," but an expert opinion. 12 However, a police officer's
statement that a white, powdery substance on a suspect appeared to be sheetrock
dust was a lay opinion that required no specialized knowledge.113
The distinction between lay and expert testimony is important for several
reasons. "Expert testimony and opinions are subject to special discovery rules in
both the civil and criminal arenas."" 4 The need to offer, qualify and have
accepted a witness as an expert prior to the testimony being received is a predi-
cate to Rule 702 testimony.115 "The proper procedure and policy when an expert
witness is offered is for the court to permit qualification by the party offering the
expert witness, and then to permit voir dire by the opposite party before ruling
on the competency of the witness.""' 6 Later discussed here will be the perceived
requirement under amended Rule 702 for a searching pre-admission review of
offered expert testimony. It is only expert testimony that invokes the Daubert
requirements. Lay opinion testimony is subject to a much less stringent stan-
dard.
The 2003 revision to the rule added to the comment a reference to an impor-
tant United States Supreme Court opinion on the reach of a trial judge's obliga-
tions under Rule 702. In Kuhmo Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,11 7 the Supreme
Court held that the trial judges need to be assured of the basis and reliability of
testimony also applied to nonscientific evidence based on any form of technical
or specialized knowledge. 8 More on this "gatekeeping" function will appear
subsequently in this article, but it is important to note the general applicability of
the procedures being discussed to all forms of evidence that are to be analyzed
under Rule 702.
D. Purpose of Evidence: Assist the Trier of Fact
Rule 702 allows for the admission of expert testimony if it will "assist" the
fact-finder. That has been the standard since the original Rule 702. Whether
expert testimony will actually assist is not often the central controversy, but it
does arise occasionally. The supreme court has considered the issue of relevance
to be the same as whether the expert testimony would assist.
An expert on tax calculations and loss of use of income was called to explain
the amount of damages suffered by the plaintiff when the defendant real estate
company allegedly overlooked title defects on a home.1 9 The court found that
112. Seal v. Miller, 605 So. 2d 240, 244 (Miss. 1992).
113. Florence v. State, 786 So. 2d 409,417 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
114. Langston, 670 So. 2d at 4 (citing Miss. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(4); UNWF. CRiM. R. CIR. CT. 4.06(a)(4), now
incorporated at UNIF. R. OF CIR. AND COUNTY CT. PRACTICE 9.04(a)(1)).
115. Id.
116. McNeal v. State, 617 So. 2d 999, 1008 n.2 (Miss. 1993) (quoting Jordan v. State, 464 So. 2d 475, 486
(Miss. 1985)).
117. 526 U.S. 137 (1999), cited in Miss. R. EvID. 702 cmt.
118. Id. at 147-48.
119. Century 21 Deep S. Props., Ltd. v. Corson, 612 So. 2d 359, 369-70 (Miss. 1992).
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though the expert was qualified, his testimony would not "help the trier of fact
understand the evidence or determine a fact in issue. 1 20 Among the matters the
expert addressed was the amount of lost income that occurred when the plaintiff
failed to take a job available to him. The plaintiff had stated that he could not
take the job because the necessary move would prevent him from resolving legal
problems with his house. The court found that the plaintiff had other options,
such as to sell or rent the home and then move to accept the job. Evidence of the
amount of lost income resulting from the plaintiffs "unemployment was not a
result of the liens on the house, [and] any loss of income he sustained is not rele-
vant to this case. 12'
If the expert testimony is relevant, its admission will probably not be found
to be reversible error even if the testimony would not be especially important to
the fact-finder. A trial judge has considerable discretion within the limits of the
evidentiary rules in deciding whether to admit or exclude evidence and will be
reversed only if that discretion was abused. 22 If expert testimony is admitted
that clearly was relevant but its assistance to the fact-finder is more tenuous, at
worst that would likely be found to be harmless error. Conversely, if such evi-
dence is rejected even though relevant, the judge's decision that it was not rea-
sonably likely to assist the fact-finder will also be reviewed through the abuse of
discretion appellate lense.
The United States Supreme Court has held that for federal courts, the same
abuse of discretion standard is applied on appeal regardless of whether the trial
judge admitted or excluded expert testimony.123 No distinction in Mississippi
appellate review was discovered.
E. Witness Qualifications: Knowledge, Skill,
Experience, Training, or Education
One unhappy dissenting justice wrote in 1986 that he would "concede that
we are liberal in this state in permitting a witness with only a modest amount of
expertise in a particular field to qualify as an expert witness therein.'
24 It is at
least arguable that one of the purposes of the Daubert approach is to require
more in the future from trial judges than has been required in the past before
concluding that an expert is qualified.
The case law in Mississippi after the adoption of the Rules of Evidence in
1985 has been guided by the former comment to Rule 702 that courts should
apply "the traditional standards for determining that the witness is indeed quali-
fied to speak an opinion on a matter within his purported field of knowledge.'
2
The new Rule 702 comment also uses that phrase but may be saying more:
120. Id. at 370.
121. Id.
122. Weaver v. State. 713 So. 2d 860, 865 (Miss. 1997).
123. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 135, 142 (1997).
124. Hooten v. State, 492 So. 2d 948, 949, 953 (Miss. 1986) (Hawkins, P.J., dissenting).
125. 474-77 So. 2d LXII (West Miss. Cases 1985); Miss. R. EVID. 702 crnt. (1985).
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By the 2003 amendment of Rule 702, the Supreme Court
clearly recognizes the gate keeping responsibility of the trial
court to determine whether the expert testimony is relevant and
reliable. This follows the 2000 adoption of a like amendment to
Fed. R. Evid. 702, adopted in response to Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). It is important
to note that Rule 702 does not relax the traditional standards for
determining that the witness is indeed qualified to speak an
opinion on a matter within a purported field of knowledge, and
that the factors mentioned in Daubert do not constitute an exclu-
sive list of those to be considered in making the determination;
Daubert's "list of factors was meant to be helpful, not defini-
tive." Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 151. See also Pepitone v. Biomatrix,
Inc. 288 F. 3d 239 (5th Cir. 2002).12
The word "gatekeeper" has been adopted as the operative concept for trial
judge's Daubert-imposed role when expert testimony is offered. 127  Such an
image for the trial judge is suggested by the Court's statement that when "a prof-
fer of expert scientific testimony" is made, "the trial judge must determine at the
outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1)
scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or deter-
mine a fact in issue.1 28
The trial judge guards the gate against witnesses who are not qualified as
well as against theories or techniques that are not reliable. The judge's role as to
the substance of the testimony is considered below. Here will be examined the
judge's function as to the qualifications of the witness.
An expert may be qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education.1 29 The Mississippi Supreme Court has never suggested that there is
a finite number of areas of expertise. The comment to Rule 702 requires that the
expertise be within "a purported field of knowledge."'' ° Accident reconstruc-
126. Miss. R. EviD. 702 cmt. (2003).
127. It was the dissent of Chief Justice Rehnquist that injected the gatekeeper image, but it was then quoted
by the majority. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589 n.7. The majority used a different image when it referred to the trial
judge's role in "screening such evidence." Id. at 589. Trial judge as "gatekeeper" instead of "screener" is uni-
versally employed as the Daubert metaphor.
128. Id. The Court footnoted Rule 104(a), which has been adopted verbatim in Mississippi.
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence of a
privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provi-
sions of subdivision (b) [pertaining to conditional admissions]. In making its determination it is
not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.
FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
129. Miss. R. EVID. 702.
130. Miss. R. EvID. 702 cmt.
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tionists,"' chiropractors,132 dentists,133 fingerprint experts,"3 4 and lawyers... are
among the specialists who have been qualified as experts in order to give testi-
mony.
Areas of expertise frequently at issue in criminal prosecutions are the vari-
ous forms of specialized knowledge acquired by law enforcement officers. This
has arisen several times in drug cases, as the prosecution may wish to explain to
the jury the significance of certain evidence found on an accused or of his modus
operandi.
"In the context of a drug case, that reasonably includes proof
regarding the nature of the drug, the manner in which it is used,
the effect it has upon the individual who uses it and related mat-
ters." Turner v. State, 478 So. 2d 300, 301 (Miss. 1985).
Explaining to the jury why someone transporting drugs would
use a rental car is similar to explaining why someone possessing
crack cocaine with intent to distribute would need scales, razor




Because police officers are often on the stand as fact witnesses, questioning
of them may stray into fields of expertise without any party noting the Rule 702
issue arising. The failure to qualify an officer as an expert is not likely to be
held to be plain error, capable of being used as a basis for reversal on appeal
even though no objection was made. The introduction of expert evidence with-
out qualifying the witness, such as how crack cocaine was made and the items
used in the process, has also been found to be harmless error because other wit-
nesses testified as to the same point. 3
In the voir dire necessary to qualify a witness as an expert if the matter is not
conceded by opposing counsel, the evidence should address the training and
experience of the witness in the field that will be the subject of the testimony.
An experienced automobile mechanic called to testify as to automobile body
damage and repair costs would need to have his qualifications explained in the
form of the details of his career and training in those areas. Unless such qualifi-
cations also "reveal specialized knowledge that would allow him to reconstruct
131. "This Court has permitted the testimony of qualified accident reconstruction experts to give opinions on
how an accident happened, the point of impact, the angle of travel, the responsibility of the parties involved,
and the interpretation of photographs." Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co., 757 So. 2d 925, 937-38 (Miss.
1999). Court of Appeals on initial appeal found that the police officer's qualifications had not been sufficiently
proven. Fielder v. Magnolia Beverage Co., 667 So. 2d 640 (Miss. Ct. App. 1995) (mem.). See also Ware v.
State, 790 So. 2d 201 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (a police officer who has received proper training may be qualified
as accident reconstructionist).
132. McCaffrey v. Puckett, 784 So. 2d 197, 202-03 (Miss. 2001).
133. McBeath v. State, 739 So. 2d 451, 453 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
134. Wilson v. State, 574 So. 2d 1324, 1334 (Miss. 1990).
135. Hurst, 691 So. 2d at 1038 (lawyer qualified as expert to testify in legal malpractice case concerning
whether it was negligence in earlier suit for lawyer to fail to raise adverse possession as an issue).
136. Milliom v. State, 755 So. 2d 1217, 1223-24 (Miss. Ct. App. 1999).
137. Kelly v. State, 553 So. 2d 517, 522 (Miss. 1989).
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the events of a collision," it would be improper to allow him to explain the cause
of an automobile accident despite his skills as.a mechanic. 138
One logical fallacy is that a person is qualified to testify as an expert solely
because of long experience. The "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or edu-
cation" may have been poorly applied. 39 Someone who has worked in a particu-
lar field for a lengthy period of time may be unsuccessful and unreliable. An
experienced physician or attorney frequently found to have committed malprac-
tice, a home-builder whose structures demonstrate shoddy workmanship, or a
farmer who rarely has a decent crop, may not be qualified to testify as experts in
the fields of their lengthy experience. At its most basic, the point can be illus-
trated by the rather unlikely field of testimonial expertise of the most effective
manner in which someone should shovel dirt into a wheelbarrow. Someone
called as an expert who is shown to have performed that task for years should
also be questioned as to his success in actually getting the dirt into the wheelbar-
row. Though it is common for experience alone to be sufficient evidence of
qualifications, more should be demanded.
F. Reliability of Theory or Technique: General Principles
If the witness is qualified to speak as an expert in the field relevant for an
issue at trial, the trial judge then is to determine whether the substance of the sci-
entific or other expert testimony is reliable. Daubert stated that "[m]any factors
will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to set out a definitive checklist
or test. But some general observations are appropriate." 4 '
1. An important question on "whether a theory or technique is scientific
knowledge that will assist the trier of fact will be whether it can be (and has
been) tested.
141
2. "Another pertinent consideration is whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication. Publication (which is but one
element of peer review) is not a sine qua non of admissibility; it does not neces-
sarily correlate with reliability, and in some instances well-grounded but innova-
tive theories will not have been published...." , 42
3. "Additionally, in the case of a particular scientific technique, the court




4. The existence of standards controlling the technique's operation and
whether the offered expert applied those standards and controls. 44
138. Poirrier v. Degrande, 604 So. 2d 268, 270 (Miss. 1992). Cf Gen. Motors Corp. v. Pegues, 738 So. 2d
746, 751-52 (Miss. Ct. App. 1998) (allowing mechanic to testify as to the significance of the manner in which
certain metal in a wheel assembly was bent, while dissent found that the expertise was inadequate for the testi-
mony); Pegues at 762 (Southwick, J., dissenting).
139. Miss. R. Evm. 702.
140. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593.
141. Id.
142. Id. (internal citations omitted).
143. Id. at 594 (internal citations omitted).
144. Id.
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5. Finally, "general acceptance" can have a bearing on the inquiry. A "reli-
ability assessment does not require, although it does permit, explicit identifica-
tion of a relevant scientific community and an express determination of a partic-
ular degree of acceptance within that community." 4 '
The new comment to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 702 specifically refers to
Daubert and to the non-exclusive list of factors. Thus certainly a trial court's
determination of whether evidence is "relevant and reliable" is to be guided by
versions of the Daubert factors. Though these factors are said to be flexible
considerations and explicitly are neither exhaustive nor definitive, there is a ten-
dency in judicial review for such objective, enumerated lists to ossify into unal-
terable requirements. That is a bias for simplification-judges need not consider
what is most relevant to each case individually, which is a subjective matter, but
instead can examine objectively whether a preauthorized list of considerations
have been applied to the matter by the trial judge.
This has happened with previous lists of considerations in Mississippi. An
example is the initially flexible list of factors adopted in Albright v. Albright
14
1
that chancellors apply to determinations of child custody. The Mississippi
Supreme Court rejected the long-existing rule that custody of a quite young child
should, absent unusual circumstances, be granted the mother. "Age should carry
no greater weight than other factors to be considered, such as: health, and sex of
the child," and ten other considerations that concluded with "other factors rele-
vant to the parent-child relationship. 14 7 In the twenty years since this non-
exclusive and suggestive list was announced, the Albright factors have become
the immutable and unavoidable considerations in child custody, with failure to
describe even one of the factors on the record at times being found to be
reversible error. "Our job as a reviewing Court is only to evaluate whether the
chancellor's decision was manifestly erroneous based on a proper analysis of
each of the applicable Albright factors. This task becomes futile when chancel-
lors fail to consider and discuss each factor when rendering decisions. ' 48
The variations in expert testimony, coupled with the corresponding varying
considerations in whether the expert and the expertise are appropriate under
Rule 702, counsel against letting the Daubert flexible factors mutate into talis-
manic requirements that must be intoned by each trial judge when considering
such evidence. The state supreme court in its first significant discussion of
revised Rule 702, indicated that its intentions were to leave the factors as non-
exclusive:
[W]e do not intend to set forth a generic checklist of factors that
our state courts shall use in every instance where parties present
expert witness testimony. Rather, we choose to follow the lead
of the federal courts, using the illustrative Daubert factors for
145. Id. (quoting United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1238 (3d Cir. 1985)).
146. 437 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Miss. 1983).
147. Id.
148. Powell v. Ayars, 792 So. 2d 240, 244 (Miss. 2001).
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guidance and leaving the determination of which reliability fac-
tors are applicable in particular cases to the sound discretion of
our learned trial judges.149
Daubert was decided in 1993. The federal courts have ten years of experi-
ence in analyzing expert testimony under its precepts. How closely a trial judge
is to guard the gate of admission is the key issue. The federal courts have con-
sidered factors which are found relevant in a particular case, such as whether the
expert had performed the research on which the testimony is based solely for
purposes of the present litigation."5 ' One manner in which to review the gate-
keeping issues on the credibility of the evidence is by using the structure of the
new language that was adopted in 2003 as part of the Mississippi rule: "(1) the
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product
of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles
and methods reliably to the facts of the case.1 51
Each of these three principles address the reliability of the testimony and not
its relevance. The factors only tangentially consider whether the witness has the
needed credentials as an expert on the matter at hand. Therefore, relevance and
expertise need to be analyzed in addition to the three matters set out in this enu-
meration.
The progression of the reliability steps is first to examine the sufficiency of
the information gathered by the expert, then determine whether there are reliable
"scientific" or other methods to evaluate that information, and finally, decide
whether this particular expert has reliably brought those methods to bear on the
particular information relevant to this case.
F. Reliability of Theory or Technique:
(1) The Testimony Is Based upon Sufficient Facts or Data
The degree to which the proposed witness has investigated the subject mat-
ter before reaching conclusions is the focus of this factor.
In a suit for wrongful death brought against a trailer rental company, the
plaintiff offered an expert witness to explain how the accident occurred. The
witness was a professor of mechanical engineering, but the trial court would not
allow the testimony "because he was not an accident reconstructionist, metallur-
gist, or control and stability expert, and because he had not conducted tests to
determine how much force would be required to separate the hitch ball from the
mini-pickup's bumper. 152 Another accident reconstructionist admittedly arrived
at the accident scene after a rain had literally washed away most of the evidence
on which his expertise depended. The reconstructionist "admitted that he did
not have complete information to reconstruct the accident due to the lack of
information remaining at the accident scene at the time of his inspection." '
149. McLemore, 863 So. 2d at 40.
150. Daubert, 43 F.3d at 1317.
151. Miss. R. EviD. 702.
152. Watkins v. U-Haul Intern., Inc., 770 So. 2d 970, 973 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
153. Id. at 976.
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The Mississippi Court of Appeals upheld the exclusion of these witnesses as
being within the trial court's discretion on allowing expert testimony. The court,
before Daubert was found applicable to the Mississippi courts, still held that the
judge was the gatekeeper who was to exclude testimony based on sloppy science
and inadequate investigation.154 Though the decision predates the 2003 amend-
ment to Rule 702, the court properly required evidence that the expert's opinion
was adequately grounded in the facts necessary to reach an opinion.
The insufficiency of an expert's investigation of the circumstances in a prod-
uct liability case was one of the reasons that his opinion was excluded in
Hammond v. Coleman Co., Inc.5 ' A lantern manufactured by Coleman explod-
ed as the plaintiff attempted to light it. 56 The plaintiff testified that the lantern
squirted him with fuel and then it exploded. 1 7 The expert did not attempt to
recreate the incident, conducted no tests, and had never been involved in the
manufacture or design of lanterns. 5 The expert wanted to opine that there must
have been a design defect, but there was neither actual data nor any reliable the-
ory underlying his testimony.'
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit discussed the
requirements of an adequate factual foundation for an opinion in United States v.
14.38 Acres of Land.6 In this eminent domain suit, the trial court found that the
landowner's expert opinion about the effect on land values from potential flood-
ing resulting from the government's project was too speculative."' The trial
court saw the question as one of reliability; 16 2 the appeals court stated that the
issue was really one of weight. 63 "As a general rule, questions relating to the
bases and sources of an expert's opinion affect the weight to be assigned that opin-
ion rather than its admissibility and should be left for the jury's consideration.""
The Fifth Circuit drew what might be considered a bright line to help trial
judges in their role regarding admissibility of expert opinions. It should be used
cautiously. Certainly there is a line to be drawn between "evidentiary reliabili-
ty," which a trial judge must determine, and weight of evidence that is left for
the jury. Traditionally, the weight and the credibility of evidence is for the
jury.65 With the focus on excluding "junk science," though, expert opinions are
not just to be poured into the evidentiary brew for the jury without an initial
quality assessment. It seems too facile to state that "bases and sources of an
expert's opinion" are for the jury when Rule 702 requires that the testimony be
based on sufficient facts and data.
154. Id. at 974.
155. 61 F. Supp. 2d 533 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
156. Id. at 535.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 539.
159. Id.
160. United States v. 14.38 Acres of Land, More or Less, in LeFlore County, State of Miss., 80 F.3d 1074
(5th Cir. 1996).
161. Id. at 1078.
162. Id. at 1077.
163. Id. at 1079.
164. Id. at 1077 (quoting Viterbo v. Dow Chem. Co., 826 F.2d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 1987)).
165. Id.
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The disagreement between the trial and appellate courts in 14.38 Acres pre-
sents the issues that must be faced under the gatekeeping function. The
approach that makes the most sense under the whole point of the Daubert exer-
cise is that a trial judge performs an initial assessment on all quality issues at the
time of determining admissibility. Only if the evidence meets the minimum
standard as to factual bases, reliable method, and reliable application of method
should it be admitted.
F. Reliability of Theory or Technique:
(2) The Testimony Is the Product of Reliable Principles and Methods
Whether the principles and methods used by the expert are reliable depends
on more than that purported expert's opinion. This is the key factor in distin-
guishing between what colloquially is called "junk science" and what is suffi-
ciently validated for admission as evidence in litigation. Daubert requires a
"preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying
the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether the reasoning or methodolo-
gy properly can be applied to the facts in issue." '166 An opinion is not based on
scientific knowledge unless it is within the methods and procedures of science,
i.e., it must be testable.167 Daubert spoke in terms of science, but Kuhmo Tire
makes it plain that the same analysis applies to all technical subjects on which
allegedly expert opinions are to be offered. 6"
The five non-exclusive considerations identified in Daubert and incorporat-
ed in Mississippi's rule by reference are all relevant to this question. In shorter
form version, these examine 1) whether the scientific method has been tested, 2)
whether there has been peer review of the method such as in publications, 3) the
error rate of the method, 4) the existence and maintenance of standards and con-
trols, and 5) general acceptance of the method in the "relevant scientific commu-
nity." '169 These factors are far more applicable to traditional science than to other
areas of expertise, such as auto mechanics. However, since Kuhmo Tire was
also referenced in the Rule 702 comment, these sorts of standards must apply to
the admission of nonscientific expert testimony as well. 7
These are not traditional considerations in Mississippi practice. Thus there
is likely to be some struggle with what is now demanded. What all of them ana-
lyze is whether the method being applied by the expert has gained "evidentiary
reliability," 71 meaning that it has been tested and confirmed in meaningful ways.
To retum to the example in General Motors Corp. v. Pegues,7 2 it would not be
sufficient for a plaintiff to call an auto mechanic who simply assures the trial
court that he can tell how an accident occurred by looking at how metal was bent
on a wheel assembly. The party offering the evidence must be prepared to
166. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
167. Id. at 590.
168. Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 147.
169. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 393-594.
170. Miss R. EVID. 702 cmt. (citing Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. 137).
171. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
172. 738 So. 2d at 751-52.
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demonstrate in some manner that the technique used by the witness to make his
determination is a recognized one. Perhaps there have been publications on the
subject; perhaps automobile manufacturers or others have made studies that
demonstrate the effectiveness of examining the markings that this expert is rely-
ing upon. There may be other means within the skill of the advocate to establish
technique credibility. Regardless, something outside the courtroom must give
the technique credibility. It is not enough that the offered expert says "trust me,
I can tell from this data." Such issues will cause gatekeepers to earn their pay.
Though no country-wide review of the federal case law that has dealt with
the issue will be undertaken, a few Mississippi federal cases may be instructive.
In a district court case, a veterinarian was "prepared to opine on the causal rela-
tionship between the presence of aflatoxin in corn feed allegedly sold by defen-
dant to plaintiff and the death, illness, infertility and milk-producing inability of
plaintiffs dairy cattle." '173 The veterinarian said he relied on his own experience
and upon laboratory reports that indicated the presence of aflatoxin in some of
the cattle."' The problem with the evidence was that nothing besides the wit-
ness's assurances justified the conclusion that the level of aflatoxin found in the
cattle was harmful:
This court is not persuaded that Rollins' methodology in reach-
ing his conclusion passes the Daubert test. Dr. Rollins testified
that after observing the cattle on more than one occasion, he
noted that their symptoms indicated aflatoxicosis. Dr. Rollins
acknowledges that he did not order any blood tests, urine tests
or tissue tests. Further, he acknowledges that the symptoms he
observed are common to other cattle illnesses. While he says he
relied upon the autopsy report of two slain cattle for that pur-
pose, he admits that the autopsy reports failed to show that the
cattle suffered from pneumonia and failed to show that the cattle
suffered from aflatoxicosis .... Dr. Rollins is unable to make a
connection between this slight level of aflatoxin in the milk
sample (an amount not proscribed by the United States Food
and Drug Administration) and the amount of aflatoxin that was
in the feed fed to the cow producing this milk. Further, Dr.
Rollins is unable to state within the realms of scientifically
accepted data what concentration of aflatoxin in corn feed fed to
dairy cattle over what period of time would cause the harm to
dairy cattle about which plaintiff complains. Dr. Rollins
acknowledged that he did not know what measure of concentra-
tion would cause harm, only that he believes that any amount of
aflatoxin would hurt. He does not clothe his naked opinion with
any scientific literature. The United States Food and Drug
Administration in its regulation of aflatoxin in milk proscribes
any presence of aflatoxin in excess of 0.5 ppb. This prohibition
173. Greer v. Bunge Corp., 71 F. Supp. 2d 592, 593 (S.D. Miss. 1999).
174. Id. at 595.
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governs the integrity of milk, but does not speak to that quantity
which would cause dairy cattle to become ill, infertile, and die.17
The failure of the expert to be able to point to anyone sharing his opinion on the
proper analysis of unsafe levels of aflatoxin was fatal to his testimony.
One of the significant difficulties in applying Rule 702 will be in determin-
ing the rootedness of the opinion. Daubert and the change to Rule 702 force the
parties and the trial court to grapple with whether the opinion is shared by any-
one other than the witness. For scientific evidence for which publications and
peer review may exist, there are readily understandable methods of seeking cred-
ibility checks. For other kinds of testimony, Kuhmo Tire provides guidance:
[Daubert] made clear that its list of factors was meant to be
helpful, not definitive. Indeed, those factors do not all necessari-
ly apply even in every instance in which the reliability of scien-
tific testimony is challenged. It might not be surprising in a par-
ticular case, for example, that a claim made by a scientific wit-
ness has never been the subject of peer review, for the particular
application at issue may never previously have interested any
scientist. Nor, on the other hand, does the presence of Daubert's
general acceptance factor help show that an expert's testimony is
reliable where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for exam-
ple, do theories grounded in any so-called generally accepted
principles of astrology or necromancy.
At the same time ... some of Daubert's questions can help
to evaluate the reliability even of experience-based testimony. In
certain cases, it will be appropriate for the trial judge to ask, for
example, how often an engineering expert's experience-based
methodology has produced erroneous results, or whether such a
method is generally accepted in the relevant engineering com-
munity. Likewise, it will at times be useful to ask even of a wit-
ness whose expertise is based purely on experience, say, a per-
fume tester able to distinguish among 140 odors at a sniff,
whether his preparation is of a kind that others in the field would
recognize as acceptable.
The trial court must have the same kind of latitude in decid-
ing how to test an expert's reliability, and to decide whether or
when special briefing or other proceedings are needed to investi-
gate reliability, as it enjoys when it decides whether or not that
expert's relevant testimony is reliable.7 6
175. Id. at 595.
176. Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 151-52 (emphasis added).
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More will be said concerning procedure later. Yet it is important to note that
the abuse of discretion standard with which decisions on admitting evidence are
reviewed on appeal provides latitude to make decisions on relevance and relia-
bility but does not provide license to ignore the new standards propounded by
Rule 702. Daubert itself provides that "the relevant reliability concerns may
focus upon personal knowledge and experience" of the offered expert."' The
test is a flexible one and must bend to the nature of the evidence. The abuse of
discretion standard used by an appellate court in reviewing the trial judge's rul-
ing "applies as much to the trial court's decisions about how to determine relia-
bility as to its ultimate conclusion. Thus, whether Daubert's specific factors are,
or are not, reasonable measures of reliability in a particular case is a matter that
the law grants the trial judge broad latitude to determine.""1 8
As Justice Breyer stated in Kuhmo Tire, the factors relevant for nonscientific
evidence will be especially susceptible to the exercise of trial court discretion.
Yet that discretion must be a reasonable application of the need to permit reli-
able expert testimony and to block at the gate that evidence which cannot be
qualified. What cannot reasonably be measured for reliability must not be
admitted due to the inherent difficulties of qualifying certain kinds of expertise.
An unavoidable requirement now for expert opinion is that it be proven reliable.
Evidentiary difficulties cannot swallow the rule requiring evidentiary reliability.
F. Reliability of Theory or Technique:
(3) The Witness Has Applied the Principles and Methods Reliably
to the Facts of the Case.
This factor is nothing more than requiring proof that the expert has taken
meaningful data about the relevant facts of the case and applied the reliable
method to the data before reaching the conclusion that is the subject of the testi-
mony. The expert must explain what he did to reach the opinion offered, suffi-
cient in detail that the gatekeeper can determine whether the abstract principles
have been applied to the concrete facts.
The principle does not mean that an expert may never testify on the general
background of a complicated scientific or technical issue in a case. For exam-
ple, an expert may be called to explain what DNA is and what DNA matching
can prove, even if that witness has not examined any of the evidence in the case.
There may be questions of undue duplication of other testimony, as presumably
a witness who has examined the specific DNA evidence in the case would also
explain the nature of the science. Still, if an expert witness is offered to testify
on an issue relevant to the case, and if that testimony would assist the trier of
fact, it is within the properly exercised discretion of the trial judge to admit it.
177. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592.
178. Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 139.
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The Fifth Circuit addressed with some care the reliability of an expert's
opinion that individuals can be injured by excessive levels of benzene, and fur-
ther that the plaintiffs in this particular case were injured by benzene.179 The
witness was well-supported in his conclusion as to causation in the abstract,
being able to recite several scientific studies supporting his theory and the
Occupational Safety and Health Administrations standard on benzene. 8 The
Fifth Circuit disagreed with the trial court's decision that the witness failed to
support his "ultimate conclusion that Plaintiffs' symptoms were caused by their
exposure to benzene[; the trial court found the conclusion] was not reliable
because [the plaintiffs] failed to demonstrate with sufficient certainty the amount
of benzene to which they were exposed." '81 The trial judge's focus was cor-
rect-if the expert did not have sufficient data to determine the amount of expo-
sure of these plaintiffs, then his opinion regarding causation should be
excluded. 82 The appeals court simply disagreed with how precise the data had
to be and found that the expert's opinion on the levels of exposure to these
workers was reasonably supported. 83
Had the witness not been able to gather reasonable data on the degree of
exposure experienced by the plaintiffs, the testimony of causation as to the
plaintiffs' symptoms would not have been credible and the general testimony
about the issue not relevant. "Under Daubert, 'any step that renders the analy-
sis unreliable . . . renders the expert's testimony inadmissible. This is true
whether the step completely changes a reliable methodology or merely misap-
plies that methodology."'
1 84
A failure properly to apply the scientific principles to the data was one of the
problems in the medical malpractice case of Tanner v. Westbrook.185 The issue
was whether a newborn's cerebral palsy was caused by asphyxiation at the time
of delivery or instead was congenital. 8 The plaintiffs' expert was able to say,
based on medical literature, that birth asphyxia was at times a cause of cerebral
palsy. 87 Yet what the same literature revealed and what the defense experts
made plain, was that birth asphyxia rarely is the cause and when it is, there are
other physical indications. 88 The plaintiffs "provided no medical literature sup-
porting their experts' claims that Jennifer's symptoms ... were consistent with
their theory of causation." '89  Finally, the plaintiffs' experts had not conducted
the kind of physical exam that the literature also indicated was needed to rule out
the more likely causes, the ones that the defense experts testified likely caused
the child's problems.8
179. Curtis v. M & S Petroleum, Inc., 174 F.3d 661, 669 (5th Cir. 1999).
180. Id.
181. Id. at670.
182. Id. at 671.
183. Id.
184. Id. (quoting In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 745 (3d Cir. 1994)).
185. 174 F.3d 542 (5th Cir. 1999).
186. Id.
187. Id. 545-46.
188. Id. at 547.
189. Id. at 548.
190. Id. at 548.
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It is difficult to imagine that before the amendment to Mississippi's Rule
702, that the state supreme court would have permitted the exclusion of this sort
of expert opinion. A much more intensive examination of the testimony under
the Daubert considerations must be made than is traditional under Mississippi
practice. The trial judge in Tanner was obligated to examine the reliability of
the experts' opinions against the literature that was offered to support them. The
logical fallacy of the plaintiffs' opinion had to be noticed and action taken in the
form of exclusion. One can disagree both with the policy behind Daubert and
its application in Tanner. In this author's view, though, the requirements
applied by the Fifth Circuit were also what now must be applied in Mississippi
state practice. The policy has already been adopted in the new state Rule 702.
It is no longer just for juries to sort out the implications of expert testimony.
It is now a gatekeeper function to keep from the jury theories that do not pass
minimal reliability standards, whether the problem is in the abstract or in its
application to the facts of the case.
G. Additional Considerations: Ultimate Issues or Legal Conclusion
There was under former Mississippi practice a prohibition on any witness's
testifying as to the "ultimate issue" in the case.191 Rule 704 permits an opinion,
whether from lay or expert witnesses, to be given even though it "embraces an
ultimate issue to be decided by the trier of fact." '192
A controlling principle regardless of the substance of the expert testimony is
that it "must be both within the expertise of the witness and assist the trier of
fact." '93 In one case, it was found error to permit an accident reconstruction
expert to testify that the defendant's actions were negligent-not simply because
this was an ultimate issue in the case, but because the legal concept of "negli-
gence" was not within the expertise of the witness.194
A distinction made in the comment to the Federal Rules, which was quoted
in the state rule comments, is this:
[T]he question in a will contest, "Did the testator have the
capacity to make a will" is still not permitted, whereas the ques-
tion, "Did the testator have sufficient mental capacity to know
the nature and extent of his property and the natural objects of
his bounty and to formulate a rational scheme of distribution"
would be. The former question is not helpful; the latter is.19
191. Sipe v. Farmer, 398 So. 2d 1325, 1329 (Miss. 1981).
192. Miss R. EVID. 704.
193. Havard, 800 So. 2d at 1198-99 (citing Miss. R. EVID. 704; and CAROLYN ELLIS STATON, MISSISSIPPI
EVIDENCE 227-229 (3d ed. 1995)).
194. Id. at 1199.
195. Miss. R. EVID. 704 cmt.
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H. Additional Considerations: Confusing, Time-consuming,
or Unfairly Prejudicial
The "ultimate filter" for all evidence is the requirement under Rule 403 that
its probative value not be greatly outweighed by its prejudicial effect.196 Even if
evidence is relevant and survives Daubert-mandated scrutiny, it may be exclud-
ed if the following applies: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is greatly outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." '97 This rule
may cause exclusion when multiple experts are offered, or an expert is called on
a tangential concern that has already been adequately explained without expert
testimony, or the relevant subject is so unfairly prejudicial that the probative
value is greatly outweighed.
The law on Rule 403 will not be further explored here. It is sufficient for
present purposes that the new rule on expert testimony does not displace certain
old rules applicable to all evidence.
I. Additional Considerations: Summary Judgment
Much of the discussion so far has been in the context of whether a trial judge
should allow the admission of expert opinions at trial. Equally important proce-
durally will be the utilization of expert opinion in the form of affidavits or depo-
sitions in summary judgment motions.
In the federal system, the issue of whether Daubert applies during summary
judgment has been resolved in favor of applicability.
The plaintiff posits that Daubert is strictly a time-of-trial phe-
nomenon. She is wrong. The Daubert regime can play a role
during the summary judgment phase of civil litigation. If prof-
fered expert testimony fails to cross Daubert's threshold for
admissibility, a district court may exclude that evidence from
consideration when passing upon a motion for summary judg-
ment.
1 98
The First Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Daubert principles should
not be used "profligately" in summary judgment, since the "trial setting normal-
ly will provide the best operating environment for the triage which Daubert
demands." '99 Nonetheless, the reliability and relevance issues are for the judge,
so there is no need for a jury to address these considerations.
196. Miss. R. Evm. 403; Ware v. Entergy Mississippi, Inc., No. 2002-1A-00858-SCT ( 29)(Miss. Dec. 31,
2003)).
197. Miss. R. Evm. 403.
198. Cortes-Irizarry v. Corporacion Insular De Seguros, 111 F.3d 184, 188 (1st Cir. 1997).
199. Id.
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The opinion from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
Pipitone v. Biomatrix, Inc., that is cited in the Mississippi comment, was an
appeal from a summary judgment."' The court did not even address whether the
Daubert considerations applied and immediately went about considering
whether the district judge had properly applied them. Even during summary
judgment, the "court's responsibility is 'to make certain that an expert, whether
basing testimony upon professional studies or personal experience, employs in
the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice
of an expert in the relevant field. "201
Therefore, there is an additional consideration if the issue of the relevance
and reliability of expert testimony is being addressed during summary judgment
as compared to during a preliminary Daubert hearing or at trial. If the evidence
presented through affidavits or the testimony at an actual evidentiary hearing do
not permit a comprehensive examination of the proper factors to make a Daubert
review, then the issue of admissibility of expert testimony will need to await an
opportunity for presentation of that complete picture.
In Mississippi practice, the appellate courts apply a de novo standard of
review to the trial judge's decision that there was no dispute of material fact and
that summary judgment should be granted.0 2 Since the trial judge is the fact-
finder on the application of the considerations for compliance with Rule 702, the
supreme court will need to address whether review of that decision from a sum-
mary judgment is by applying an abuse of discretion standard or also de novo.
The Fifth Circuit in the Pipitone decision examined whether the trial judge in
summary judgment had abused his discretion, and did not consider the issue de
novo.
20 3
J. Special Test: DNA Evidence
The supreme court before its adoption of Rule 702 amendments in 2003,
determined that the esoteric science of DNA evidence required a searching
examination by the trial judge before admission. 4 In Polk v. State, the court
adopted the following three-part test:
I. Is there a theory, generally accepted in the scientific com-
munity, that supports the conclusion that DNA forensic testing
can produce reliable results?
II. Are there current techniques that are capable of produc-
ing reliable results in DNA identification and that are generally
accepted in the scientific community?
200. Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 241.
201. Id. at 244 (quoting Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152).
202. Jenkins v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 794 So. 2d 228, 232 (Miss. 2001).
203. Pipitone, 288 F.3d at 245.
204. Polk, 612 So. 2d at 390.
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III. In this particular case, did the testing laboratory perform
generally accepted scientific techniques without error in the per-
formance or interpretation of the tests? 5
This test was also applied when the distinguishable issue of mitochondrial
DNA evidence was first addressed by an appellate court." 6 This latter sort of
DNA evidence is less conclusive than what may be determined if nuclear DNA
matching is available. Nonetheless, if the witness and the evidence were proper-
ly qualified out of the presence of the jury, and if the limitations of the evidence
were adequately explained to the jury, mitochondrial DNA evidence was admis-
sible.
The similarities of these three factors with the Daubert regime for consider-
ing expert testimony are obvious. The test therefore could easily have much
wider application than just to DNA testing. However, the Mississippi Supreme
Court later stated that the Polk test would only apply to DNA evidence. 7 It is
true that another decision applied Polk to a different kind of expert testimony-
the validity of the Horizontal Gaze Nystagmus Test that some law enforcement
officers are trained to use to detect a suspect's impairment from alcohol or
drugs.
208
A continuing effort might have occurred to give Polk wider applicability had
Rule 702 not been amended in 2003. Now there is little reason to use the Polk
test since it is similar to Rule 702 but differs in terminology. What is instructive
still, though, is Polk's determination that issues of admissibility of expert testi-
mony should be determined in hearings outside the presence of the jury.2°9 As
will be explained next, the new Rule 702 standards also should be the subject
either of pretrial hearings or, if necessary, hearings that occur during trial but
without the jury's presence. That has been the practice in federal courts and is
practically necessary in order for the proper operation of the new rule.
K. Procedure
In federal practice there is often conducted what is called a Daubert hearing
to determine whether expert evidence should be admitted. This has occurred in
part because of Daubert's direction to use the admissibility requirements of
Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a):
21
1
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to
be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of
evidence shall be determined by the court, subject to the provi-
205. Id. (adopting though modifying principles described in Ex parte Perry v. State, 586 So. 2d 242, 250
(Ala.1991)).
206. Adams v. State, 794 So. 2d 1049, 1060-65 (Miss. Ct. App. 2001) (Southwick, P.J., concurring).
207. Puckett v. State, 737 So. 2d 322, 342 (Miss. 1999).
208. Young v. City of Brookhaven, 693 So. 2d 1355, 1358-59 (Miss. 1997).
209. Polk, 612 So. 2d at 393.
210. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592; United States v. Fullwood, 342 F.3d 409, 412 (5th Cir. 2003).
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sions of subdivision (b) [pertaining to conditional admissions].
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evi-
dence except those with respect to privileges. "
Mississippi Rule of Evidence 104 contains the same language. 12 Kuhmo
Tire held that no hearing is needed "in ordinary proceedings where the reliability
of an expert's methods is properly taken for granted." '213 How often the reliabili-
ty is "taken for granted" is difficult to gauge, but the focus of the hearing will
largely be on reliability as the foregoing review of Daubert requirements has
revealed. If reliability is not really an issue, then a hearing is not really a necessity.
The procedure to implement the Rule 702 amendments is not expressly set
out in the rule or comments. In those circumstances in which the question of the
admission of expert testimony requires rigorous attention by the parties and the
trial judge to an array of evidence, then a hearing is desirable. If the matter can
be resolved at a pretrial hearing, then significant evidentiary issues that affect
the course of the case may be resolved effectively and efficiently. Even if the
admissibility of a particular expert's opinion is not considered until the witness
is called at trial, the procedure of having a separate hearing could be utilized at
that juncture if the complexity of the evidentiary presentation suggests the need.
A Mississippi federal district court explained the process this way:
Daubert also instructs the trial court on the procedural mechan-
ics for resolving disputes relative to the expert's competence to
testify under the standards enunciated by Daubert. Daubert
directs that the district court determine admissibility under Rule
702 by following the directions provided in Rule 104(a). Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides that preliminary questions
concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness, the
existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be
determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision
(b). So, Rule 104(a) requires the trial judge to conduct a prelimi-
nary fact-finding and to make a "preliminary assessment of
whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony
is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodol-
ogy properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 592-93.214
What this means is that the trial judge has discretion that will be case-specif-
ic on the procedural mechanism to employ, the factors to apply, and the decision
on whether to admit or exclude. The process must be focused and thorough.
Trial judges operating as if they will be affirmed simply because decisions on
the admissibility of evidence are largely within the discretion of the trial judge
211. FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
212. Miss. R. EVID. 104(a).
213. Kuhmo Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
214. Greer, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 593-594.
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will likely discover that this standard will not cover the failure to exercise their
discretion within the explicit guidelines of the new rule. Consequently, explicit
findings will be much more important on expert testimony than in the past.
There are important matters of reliability to consider, including suggested fac-
tors to apply and others to be developed that in a particular case may be more
relevant that those initially discussed in Daubert.
At the end of a hearing in which these issues are explored through evidence
and argument, the judge should enter findings and conclusions to support the
decision on admissibility. With discretion comes the obligation to explain its
exercise.
Trial and appellate judges do not always deliberate with mutual appreciation
for the difficulties and demands of the other level judges. Requirements may be
imposed from on high which are resented by those who are supposed to apply
them. One judge refused on remand to implement the mandate of the appellate
court, which was seeking more information to explain the basis of an earlier rul-
ing. Another judge indicated on the record some irritation about the degree of
intrusion by the supreme court into his deliberations on divorce issues:
By edict of the Supreme Court of this state, I am mandated to
consider the Albright factors in awarding child custody and
related matters....
In connection with the question of alimony, again, our
Supreme Court has blessed us with guidelines and factors ....
Without delineating my specific consideration, I can assure you
and assure the Supreme Court, if they should review this case,
that I have read their instructions, and I have acted like the jury
acts, consider them and determine the issues before me.21
If the Rule 702 amendments are implemented with similar skepticism, reluc-
tance and even refusal, the process will fail. Cases will not as a result be
affirmed; they will likely be reversed and remanded.
The parties are entitled to a good faith application of these rules by the trial
courts. The trial courts in turn, if they use procedures capable of exploring these
issues and then fully explain their rulings, are entitled on appeal to the discretion
that is inherent in their position.
IV. CONCLUSION
This article has focused on rules. The rulemaking authority that has been
claimed by the supreme court is exerted in different ways. The court seeks to
exercise that authority in a cooperative spirit. When cooperation with another
branch of government fails, though, the court will insist that its rules control.
The arguments presented here that the power may have been extended beyond
what initial understandings and the actual constitutional text would permit are
offered respectfully and in recognition that these opinions are somewhat incon-
215. The origins of these comments are left unstated. Whether apocryphal or factual, they represent the
stresses of appellate review responsibility. Judicial proprieties suggest leaving identifiers off these examples.
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sistent with the institutional needs as viewed by the supreme court. The point is
that other branches of government have their own constitutionally-given obliga-
tions. No assertion of rulemaking should seek to limit other branches preroga-
tives other than through suggestions, cooperation and invitation for discussion.
It is likely beyond reconsideration that the supreme court has plenary author-
ity to make most of the rules affecting the courts. It is also largely beyond
debate that rulemaking is an essential task in the modem court system. Even
though the supreme court will no doubt continue to assert the ultimate authority,
increased cooperation might lead to employing notice and comment procedures
for all rulemaking. This would invite broader participation by other interested
parties. The procedure for notice and comment offered by the Advisory
Committee on Rules and under Appellate Rule 27(f) might be utilized as to
every rule. The Rules of Civil Procedure, Evidence, and Appellate Procedure
involve the interests and expertise of many actors on the public and professional
stage. Consideration should be given to allowing all an opportunity to perform
their available roles.
In fairness I note that other, arguably more discerning, observers do not
share these concerns. The supreme court's rules revision initiatives earned the
2004 Judicial Innovation Award from two Jackson area bar associations."' 6
Issues of temporary judicial appointments are not especially salient, as it is a
historical rarity for a governor to name a justice to a temporary vacancy. Yet the
court might reconsider asserting that such appointments are unconstitutional.
Instead it might decide that a governor has that power but could be encouraged
not to exercise it except in extraordinary situations of lengthy temporary vacan-
cies or when a quorum of participating appellate jurists cannot be obtained for a
case.
The specific amended rule regarding expert testimony has been explored
here because of the significance of the change that has been wrought. Daubert
is explicitly a focus on whether an offered expert has scientific knowledge that
will assist the fact-finder in understanding and resolving a fact that is in issue. 7
The traditional rule has been similar, as Rule 702 since it was adopted has
sought to admit such "scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge" as
will assist in understanding the case. The effect of the new rule is to create a
more systematic and open manner in which to consider the issues created by
proffered expert testimony.
There are certain to be still more significant changes in the future to court
procedures. The announcement of these new rules should never be viewed as a
dark day, but as one in which improvements to the operation of the courts are
being diligently pursued even if disagreement as to the particulars may often
arise.
216. Presiding Justice William L. Waller, Jr., who chairs the supreme court's rules comittee, received the
award. Program, Hinds County Bar Association & Jackson Young Lawyers Association, "An Evening
Honoring the Judiciary" (May 6, 2004), at 2 (on file with author).
217. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592
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